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FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS IN CAPITAL CASES:
ALWAYS "AT ISSUE"
John H. Blune,t
Stephen P. Garveyl
& Sheri LynnJohnsonlt-

Under Simmons v. South Carolina, a capital defendant who, if not
sentenced to death, will remain in prison with no chance ofparole is constitutionally entitled to an instruction inforning the juiy of thatfact, but only
if the prosecutionengages in conduct that places the defendant'sfuture dangerousness "at issue." Based on data collectedfrom interviews with South
Carolina capitaljurors, Professors Blum4 Garmey, andJohnson argue that
future dangerousness is on the minds of most capitaljurors,and is thus "at
issue" in virtually all capitaltrials, regardless of the proscution's conduct.
Accordingly, the authors argue that the "at issue" requirement of Simmons
serves no real purpose and should be eliminated.

INTRODUCTION

Capital jurors face a hard choice. They must impose a sentence
of death, or a sentence of life imprisonment. One or the other. But
for many jurors the choice is even harder.
The problem is this: Even where the alternative to death is life
imprisonment, and where life imprisonment means life imprisonment
without any possibility of parole, jurors may nonetheless believe that
the defendant, if not sentenced to death, will one day find his way to
freedom. In the minds of these jurors, the choice is really between
death and something ess than life imprisonment, and this imagined
but false choice will prompt them to cast their vote for death. Forced
to choose, jurors would prefer to see the defendant executed rather

than run the risk that he will someday be released.
t Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell Death Penalty
Project.

-i
I-

Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Co-Director, Comell Death Penalty Project.
The empirical results we describe below, sce infra Part III.B, were presented to the
United States Supreme Court in a brief amicus curiaesubmitted by the Cornell Death Penalty Project in support of the petitioner in Shafer v. South Carolina. SeeBriefAmicus Curiaeof
the Cornell Death Penalty Project in Support of Petitioner, Shafer %.South Carolina, No.
00-5250 (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000).
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In Simmons v. South Carolina,' the Supreme Court tried to craft a
solution to this problem. A plurality of the Simmons Court held that
when state law authorizes the jury to impose a life sentence without
the possibility of parole, due process entitles a capital defendant to
inform the jury about his parole ineligibility. 2 But Simmons came with
a catch: A capital defendant was entitled to this remedy only if the
state placed his future dangerousness "at issue."3 Otherwise, the jury
was to be left to its own devices, forced to rely on its own understanding, however far off the mark, of what life imprisonment really meant.
But why the "at issue" requirement? The most likely explanation
is ultimately empirical. On this account, the rule in Simmons is designed to obviate juror misapprehension about parole ineligibility and
thereby promote reliability in capital sentencing. 4 The "at issue" requirement, in turn, reflects the empirical assumption that capital jurors worry about the defendant's future dangerousness, and thus
about what a sentence of life imprisonment really means, only if the
state injects the issue of future dangerous into the proceedings. If
not, jurors will think little, if at all, about future dangerousness, and
5
no remedial instruction is needed.
We disagree. Based on the results of interviews with over a hundred jurors who served on capital cases in South Carolina, all conducted in connection with the nationwide Capital Jury Project (CJP),O
we argue that the "at issue" requirement is misguided because the empirical assumption on which it rests is false: We find that future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors, and is thus "at issue"
1 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Simmons has two progeny, O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151
(1997), and Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113 (2000). In O'Dell the Court held that
Simmons was a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and
thus was unavailable to a petitioner claiming its benefit in federal habeas corpus. 521 U.S,
at 153. In Ramdass, the Court held that Simmons only applied if the defendant was ineligible for parole under state law at the time of his sentencing trial. 120 S. Ct. at 2116 (plurality opinion).
2
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156 (plurality opinion) (holding that "where the defendant's
future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole,
due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole
ineligible").
3
Id. (plurality opinion).
4 We address and reject another possible justification for the "at issue" requirement
at infra Part III.C.
5
Cf Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161-62 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing thatjuror misun.

derstanding of defendant's parole ineligibility was "encouraged... by the State's repeated
suggestion that petitioner would pose future danger to society if he were not executed"

(emphasis added)); id. at 164 (plurality opinion) (stating that " [ t ] he trial court's refusal to
apprise the jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determination, particularlywhen
the prosecution alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in its argument to the
jury, cannot be reconciled with ... the Due Process Clause" (emphasis added)).
6 See infra Part II.
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in virtually all capital trials, no matter what the prosecution says or
does not say.
We make this point now for a reason. The United States Supreme
Court currently has pending before it Shafer v. South Carolina.7 Shafer
is important because it presents the Court with an opportunity to
eliminate the Simmons "at issue" requirement altogether. Although
the Court can, as we explain, decide Shaferwithout taking this step, we
nonetheless hope that the analysis and evidence we present here, and
which we presented to the Court in an amicus brief,8 will persuade its
members that the costs of the "at issue" requirement outweigh its
benefits.
Part I explains the issues facing the Court in Shafer. Part II briefly
describes the organization, objectives, and methodology of the CJP.
Part I first reviews findings from prior CJP research that underscore
the central role future dangerousness plays in the decision making of
capital jurors; it then presents additional results which, we believe,
show that even when the prosecution is silent about the defendant's
future dangerousness, future dangerousness is nonetheless "at issue"
in virtually all capital cases.
I
SHAR v. SOUTH

IROLWNA

Nineteen-year-old Wesley Shafer was convicted in South Carolina
for the murder of Ray Broome. 9 During the penalty phase of Shafer's
trial, the court instructed the jury that South Carolina law gave its
members one of two choices: death or life imprisonment. Relying on
Simmons, defense counsel argued that Shafer was also entitled to an
instruction informing the jury that life imprisonment under existing
South Carolina law meant life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole. 10 Counsel requested this "Simmons instruction" because he
wanted the jurors to know that Shafer, if not sentenced to death,
would spend the rest of his days behind prison walls.
However, Simmons imposes two conditions on a capital defendant's right to obtain an instruction on his parole ineligibility. First,
the defendant must in fact never be eligible for parole under applicable state law;'1 second, the prosecutor must place the defendant's future dangerousness "at issue."' 2 Shafer's lawyer argued that both
7

121 S.Ct. 30 (2000), granlingce. to 531 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 2000).

8

Brief Amkus Curiae of the Cornell Death Penalty Project in Support of Petitioner,

Shafer v. South Carolina, No. 00-5250 (U.S. filed Nov. 13, 2000).
9
10
11

12

Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 526.
Id at 527.
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (plurality opinion).

Id. (plurality opinion).
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conditions were satisfied in his client's case: Shafer would be ineligible
for parole for life under South Carolina law if the jury voted to impose

a sentence of life imprisonment, and the solicitor had introduced evidence and made a number of comments the result of which was to put
Shafer's future dangerousness "at issue." 13
The trial court disagreed. According to the trial court, the prosecutor had ultimately said or done nothing that made Shafer's future
dangerousness an issue in the case. 14 Consequently, the court refused
to tell the jury that, if its members sentenced him to life imprisonment, Shafer would never be eligible for release on parole. The court
did, however, agree to tell the jury that "life imprisonment means un15
til the death of the offender."
But that apparently was not enough. After three and one-half
hours of deliberations, the jury returned with two questions:
1. Is there any remote chance for someone convicted of murder to
become eligible for parole?
2. Under what conditions would someone convicted of murder be
16
eligible?
The trial court responded with the following:
Your consideration is restricted to what sentence to recommend. I
will remind you that what you recommend is what I will impose as
trial judge. Section 16-3-20 of our Code of Laws as applies to this
case in the process we're in states that, "for purposes of this section
life imprisonment means until the death of the offender." Parole
eligibility or ineligibility is not for your consideration. 17
An hour and twenty minutes later the jury returned a sentence of
death, which the trial court duly imposed.' 8
On appeal, Shafer argued that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a Simmons instruction. 19 The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim. Like the trial court, the state high
court held that Simmons did not apply, but for a reason different than
that the trial court gave.

The trial court had held that Simmons did not apply because the
second condition of Simmons was not satisfied: the prosecution had not
placed Shafer's future dangerousness at issue. In contrast, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons did not apply because its

first condition was not satisfied. According to the state high court,
13

SeeJoint Appendix at 161-63, 188, Shafer v. South Carolina, No. 00-5250 (U.S. filed

Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafterJoint Appendix].
14 See id. at 164, 191-92.
15

Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 527.

16
17
18

Id.

19

Shafer, 531 S.E.2d at 527.

Id.
SeeJoint Appendix, supra note 13, at 239-43.
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Simmons applied if and only if "life without the possibility of parole
[was] ... the only legally available sentence alternative to death";20
moreover, said the court, under the capital sentencing scheme in
place when Shafer was tried-a scheme slightly different from the one
in place when the United States Supreme Court decided Simmons-

life without the possibility of parole was not the only legally av-ailable
alternative to death. 21 Consequently, the court held, Simmons no
22
longer applied at all in South Carolina.
Although we seriously doubt that the South Carolina Supreme
Court correctly applied the holding in Simrons to South Carolina's
post-Simmons sentencing scheme,2 that question is one on which the
CJP data offer no special insight. But even if the Unites State Supreme Court were to agree that Simmons continues to apply to South
Carolina's new scheme, Shafer would still need to show that the trial
court was wrong when it found that the prosecutor had never placed
future dangerousness "at issue." On this question the CJP data does
provide insight.
Based on data collected from CJP interviews with jurors who sat
on over one hundred capital cases tried in South Carolina, we argue
that Simmons' second condition-that the prosecution by word or
deed place the defendant's future dangerousness "at issue"-should
be eliminated. We make this suggestion not because we believe the
"at issue" requirement is unimportant, but rather because we find that
future dangerousness is "at issue" in virtually all capital cases, even
when the prosecution says or does nothing to put it there. A case-bycase resolution of the "at issue" requirement is therefore a waste of
judicial time and energy, not to mention the unfairness it produces
when jurors, uninformed about a defendant's ineligibility for parole
20

Id.at

21

1&

22

Id.

528 (citing State v. Starnes, 531 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 2000)).

South Carolina law in effect at the time of Shafer's trial (and still in effect today)
provided that, if the jury failed to find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a rea23

sonable doubt, the jury "shall not make a sentencing recommendation" at all. S.C. ConE
ANN.§ 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999). Under these circumstances the court-not
the jury-would sentence the defendant, with the court's only options being life imprisonment without parole or a mandatory minimum term of thirty years. Consequentl); the
jury's sentencing deliberations do not even begin unless the jury first determines that a
statutory aggravating circumstance exists, and once thejury does make that finding, the only
two choices available to it are death and life imprisonment without parole.
Moreover, even if the jury's options did include a sentence of imprisonment less than
life, the false dilemma a Simmons instruction is intended to obviate would still exist because
that dilemma exists whenever even one of the options available to the jury includes life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (and the jury is uninformed of that fact).
In other words, even if the choice facing the jurors in Shafer did include the possibility of a
sentence of imprisonment less than life, Simmons would continue to apply because the
sentencing menu facing them also included the option of life imprisonment ithout the
possibility of parole.
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because the prosecutor chose to remain silent, vote for death out of
fear that the defendant will otherwise someday be released.
II
THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT
The Capital Jury Project is a

National Science Foundation-

funded, multistate research effort designed to better understand the
dynamics ofjuror decision making in capital cases. Toward that end,
the CJP began in 1990 to interview in a number of different states
jurors who had actually served on capital cases. Analyses of the data
collected during the interviews began appearing in 1993.24

Prior to the work of the CJP, our understanding ofjuror decision
making in capital cases-and in particular of the sentencing phase of
the trial-was based primarily on mock jury studies, and on inferences
drawn from the conduct of individual cases. Each of these methodologies, though valuable, has limitations. Mock studies are open to a
variety of criticisms, not the least of which is that the experience of
mock jurors is substantially removed from that of actual jurors, perhaps especially so in capital cases. Likewise, inferences based on an
individual case or series of cases may not lend themselves to general24 Quantitative analyses of CJP data to date can be found in WilliamJ. Bowers et al.,
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-TrialExperience, and
PrematureDecision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476 (1998) (multistate data); William J.
Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and
Forced Choices in CapitalSentencing,77 TEx. L. Ruv. 605 (1999) (multistate data); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death (Sept. 28, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradoxof
CapitalJurors,74 S. CIAL. L. REv. (forthcomingJan. 2001) (South Carolina data); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in CapitalSentencing,83 CORNELL L.
REv. 1599 (1998) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in
CapitalSentencing An EmpiricalStudy, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 339 (1996) (South Carolina data);
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: JurorInstructions in CapitalCases,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1993) (South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and
Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think, 98 CoLuM. L. Rv. 1538 (1998) (Sout
Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of CapitalSentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L,
REV. 26 (2000) (South Carolina data);James Luginbuhl &Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital
SentencingInstructions: Guided orMisguided, 70 IND. LJ. 1161 (1995) (North Carolina data);
Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-CapitalJurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A
Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines,70 IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (Kentucky data); Benjamin D.
Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death PenaltyJudgments and the Tenet of Early
Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LA-w & Soc'y REv. 461 (1999) (multistate
data); Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJury and Absolution: The Intersection of Tial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557 (1998) (California data); Scott E.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay
Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1997) (California data).
Qualitative analyses of CPJ data to date can be found in Joseph L. Hoffmann, TWiere's
The Buck?-JurorMisperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. LJ.
1137 (1995) (Indiana data), and Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in
Capital Trials: The View from theJury, 70 IND. LJ. 1103 (1995) (Georgia data).

HeinOnline -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 402 2000-2001

2001]

FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS iN CAPITAL CASES

403

ization; worse, they may reflect little more than the preconceptions of
the person drawing them.
The CP and its individual researchers have to date conducted
interviews with 916jurors who sat on 257 capital trials in eleven different states (Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri,

North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia).25
The CJP's aim was to conduct interviews with at least four jurors from
a randomly selected sample of cases, half of which resulted in a final
verdict of death, and half in a final verdict of life imprisonment.26
Each juror responded to a series of questions asked during interviews generally lasting between three and four hours. The questions
covered the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the evidence
presented, the demeanor of the defendant, the actions of the victim's
family, the performance of the lawyers and the judge, the legal instructions given, the process of the jury's deliberations, and the verdict reached. Demographic information-for example, race, sex, age,
religion-was also collected, as was information about each juror's attitudes toward the death penalty and the criminal justice system more
generally. All told, each survey yielded data on over 750 variables.
The results we present below are based on the CJP's efforts in
South Carolina. The data from South Carolina are the most extensive
of all the states included in the CJP, encompassing interviews with 187
jurors in 53 cases tried in South Carolina between 1988 and 1997.22
Of the 187jurors interviewed thus far, 100 sat on one of 28 cases that
resulted in a death sentence, and 87 sat on one of 25 cases that resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment.

m
ALWAYS "AT ISSUE"

Our focus here is limited to the Simmons "at issue" requirement.
But in order to set the context, we begin with a brief review of existing
CJP findings that highlight the important role future dangerousness
plays in capital sentencing. We then present the results of the simple
25

See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 24, at 608 n.6, 647 thl.1.

See i&at 643-44.
Data collection began in South Carolina following the enactment of the South Carolina Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986. Se The Omnibus Criminal
26
27

Justice Improvements Act of 1986, 1986 S.C. Acts 2955. The 1986 Act changed the standards of parole in capital cases and provided a natural starting point for the collection of
data. See id., 1986 S.C. Acts at 2983 (changing parole eligibility for defendants convicted of
capital murder with an aggravating circumstance but not sentenced to death, from ineligibility for twenty years to ineligibility for thirty years). A later amendment to the South
Carolina death penalty statute-the one at issue in Shafer-provided that capital defendants not sentenced to death would be ineligible for parole for life. Act ofJune 7, 1995,
1995 S.C. Acts 545, 557.
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analysis that lead us to urge the Court to abandon the "at issue"
requirement.
A. Future Dangerousness
The results that have so far emerged from the research efforts of
the CJP support the following three propositions related to the role of
future dangerousness in capital sentencing:
First,"Ujurors grossly underestimate how long capital murderers
not sentenced to death usually stay in prison." 28 In South Carolina,
for example, the median juror estimate of years usually served by capital murderers not sentenced to death was only seventeen years. 29
Based on these results, the typical South Carolina juror, told only that
the alternative to a death sentence was a sentence of "life imprisonment," would have thought that nineteen-year-old Wesley Shafer
would be released at the still-threatening age of thirty-six. Less than
one percent would have thought he would never be released.30
Second, future dangerousness plays a highly prominent role in the
jury's discussions during the penalty phase. One of the earliest CJP
studies, which relied on South Carolina data, found that topics related
to the defendant's dangerousness should he ever return to society (including the possibility and timing of such a return) are second only to
the crime itself in the attention they receive during the jury's penalty
phase deliberations.31 Future dangerousness overshadows evidence
presented in mitigation (such as the defendant's intelligence, remorse, alcoholism, mental illness), as well as any concern about the
defendant's dangerousness in prison.3 2
Third, these misconceptions about parole eligibility have predictable and deadly consequences. The shorter the period of time ajuror
thinks the defendant will be imprisoned, the more likely he or she is
to vote for death on the final ballot.33 Moreover, aggregate data from
all eleven states of the CJP show that even in cases in which the prosecution's evidence and argument at the penalty phase did "not at all"
emphasize the defendant's future dangerousness, jurors who believed
the defendant would be released in under twenty years if not sentenced to death were still more likely to cast their final vote for death
than were jurors who thought the alternative to death was twenty years
34
or more.
28
29

Bowers & Steiner, supra note 24, at 648.
Id. at 647.

30

Id. at 649.

Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 24, at 6.
See id.
33
Bowers & Steiner, supra note 24, at 664; Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 24, at 6-8.
34
Bowers & Steiner, supra note 24, at 665 tbl.6. Amongjurors who believed the prosecutor did not emphasize at all that the death penalty would prevent the defendant from
31
32
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We believe these findings provide strong support for a rule
broader than Simmons. Those findings suggest that a capital defendant should have a right to tell the jury how long he will remain in
prison if not sentenced to death, even if the term of his imprisonment
under state law is less than death, and even if the prosecution does
nothing to place his future dangerousness "at issue. "3 5 In other
words, we believe these findings cast serious doubt on both of the requirements set forth in Simmons.
For now, however, we concentrate on the second requirement:
Does it makes sense, in light of how capital jurors decide capital cases,
to require the right Simmons recognizes-the right of a capital defendant to honestly tell the jury that, if its members do not sentence him
to death, he will in accordance with state law never be released from
prison-to turn on the prosecution's decision to put future dangerousness "at issue?"
B.

Testing the Empirical Assumption Behind the "At Issue"
Requirement

The "at issue" requirement, as we construe it here, is based on the
Court's empirical assumption thatjurors only worry about future dangerousness if and when the prosecution broaches the subject. However, we would have assumed just the opposite: that capital jurors
worry about future dangerousness no matter what the prosecution
says. Here we put these competing assumptions to two empirical tests.
First, if the Court's assumption is correct, then we would expect
the jury's discussions during the penalty phase to reflect worries about
future dangerousness only when the prosecution makes a point of it;
in contrast, if our assumption is correct, then we would expect the
jury's discussions to reflect worries about future dangerousness even
when the prosecution says nothing about it at all. Second, if the
Court's assumption is correct, we would expect jurors to say that future dangerousness influenced their sentencing decisions only when
the prosecution raised questions about it; in contrast, if our assumption is correct, then we would expectjurors to say that future dangerkilling again and who estimated that the alternative to a death sentence ws zero to nine
years in prison, 73.1% cast their final vote for death; similarly, among those who estimated
that the alternative was ten to nineteen years, 69.4% cast their final vote for death. In
contrast, among those who estimated that the alternative ias tw'enty years or more, only
43.8% cast their final vote for death. Id
Among jurors who believed the prosecutor did not emphasize at all the danger of
escape or release and who estimated that the alternative to a death sentence was zero to
nine years in prison, 58.1% cast their final vote for death; similarly, among those who
estimated that the alternative was ten to nineteen years, 63.3% cast their final vote for
death. In contrast, among those who estimated that the alternative was twenty years or
more, only 39.0% cast their final vote for death. Id.
35 This argument is advanced in Bowers & Steiner, supra note 24, at 712-13.
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ousness was a significant factor in their sentencing decisions
regardless of the prosecution's focus.
One question the CJP asked jurors was the following: "How
much did the prosecutor's evidence and arguments at the punishment stage of the trial emphasize the danger to the public if the defendant ever escaped or was released from prison?" The possible
responses were: a "great deal," a "fair amount," "not much," and "not
at all." Of the 187 South Carolina jurors we interviewed, fifty-three
said that the prosecutor's evidence and argument at the penalty phase
emphasized the defendant's danger to the public if he was ever released or escaped from prison "not at all." It is on this group of fiftythree that we focus the remainder of our analysis.3 6 If future dangerousness matters to this group, then it matters even when the prosecution has not placed the defendant's dangerousness "at issue."
We next look at the responses this group of jurors gave when
asked a series of questions about the topics the jury discussed during
the course of its penalty phase deliberations. We focus in particular
on how much the jury discussed various topics related to the defendant's future dangerousness. Table 1 gives the results.
TABLE 1
RESPONSES OF JURORS WHO SAID THE PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENT AT THE PUNISHMENT STAGE OF THE TRIAL EMPHASIZED

"NOT AT ALL'

THE DANGER TO THE PUBLIC IF THE DEFENDANT EvER
ESCAPED OR WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON

(%

RESPONDING)

How much did the discussion among the jurors focus on the following topics?
A Great
Fair
Not
Not At
Deal
Amount
Much
All
n
Defendant's dangerousness
if ever back in society
23
30
21
26
53
How likely he would be to
get a parole or pardon
21
40
19
21
53
How long before he got a

parole or pardon
Need to prevent him from
killing again

22

35

20

24

51

32

34

15

19

53

Even among jurors who said the prosecution made no effort
whatsoever to emphasize the defendant's future dangerousness, anywhere between twenty-one and thirty-two percent reported that the
jury's discussions during the penalty phase focused "a great deal" on a
36 In some instances the number of respondents is less than fifty-three due to one or
two missing observations.
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variety of topics related to worries about the defendant's future dangerousness. Moreover, anywhere betveen fifty-three and sixty-six percent of these same jurors reported that the jury's discussions focused
at least a "fair amount" on topics related to the defendant's future
dangerousness.
Table 2 explores the matter from slightly different angle and suggests that the jury's focus on the defendant's future dangerousness
during the penalty phase is not just talk. Concentrating once again on
those jurors who said the prosecutor emphasized "not at all" the defendant's danger to the public if he was ever released or escaped from
prison, we asked how important it was to them in deciding the defendant's punishment to "keep [ ] the defendant from ever killing again."
Forty-three percent said it was "very" important; twenty-six percent
said it was "fairly" important. In other words, nearly seventy percent of
the jurors who served on cases in which the prosecution did not put
the defendant's future dangerousness "at issue" nonetheless reported
that keeping the defendant from ever killing again was at least fairly
important to them in deciding how to vote.
TABLE 2
RESPONSES OFJJURORS WHO SAM THE PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE AND

ARGU!MENT AT THE PUNIsHmENT STAGE OF TIE TRIAL Em r tsiz
"NOT AT ALL" =HDANGER TO THE PUBuC IF THE DEFENDANT EvER
ESCAPED OR WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON

(%RESPONDING)
How important was the following consideration for you in deciding what the
defendant's punishment should be?
Not
Not at
Very
Fairly
Much
All
n
Keeping the defendant from ever

killing again
43
26
11
19
53
When you were considering the defendant's punishment, were you concerned that
the defendant might get back into society someday, if not given the death penalty?
Yes, Greatly

Yes, Somewhat

Yes, But Only

No, Not At All

Concerned

Concerned

Slightly Concerned

Concerned

n

31

29

10

31

52

Of course, the jury's concern about "keeping the defendant from
ever killing again" might include concerns about keeping him from
killing again in prison, as well as outside of it. Accordingly, we also
analyzed responses to a narrower question: How concerned was the
juror that the defendant might get back into society if not given the
death penalty. Thirty-one percent said they were "greatly concerned,"
and another twenty-nine percent said they were "somewhat con-
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cerned." That makes a total of sixty percent.37 Put differently, on an
average jury in which the prosecutor emphasized the defendant's future dangerousness "not at all," seven members would be at least
somewhat concerned that, unless sentenced to death, the defendant
might get back into society.
C. Have We Tested the Wrong Justification?
We noted at the outset that the most likely justification of the "at
issue" requirement rests on the empirical assumption we have tested
and found wanting. As an empirical matter, we can say with some
confidence that even in cases in which prosecutors have not -firmatively "raised the specter of... future dangerousness,"38 that specter is
present all the same. Indeed, the specter of future dangerousness explains why jurors-if not told-commonly ask questions about a defendant's parole eligibility,3 9 as did the jurors in Shafer's case.
But perhaps the "at issue" requirement of Simmons rests on a different justification altogether. According to this alternative theory,
due process is offended only when the state affirmatively presents a
false or misleading reason to impose the death penalty. Seen from
this perspective, the rule in Simmons is intended to monitor and prevent state misconduct, not to ensure the reliability of the jury's sentencing decision. If so, the results presented above are beside the
point, because the "at issue" requirement is not based on an empirical
assumption at all; it instead constitutes the misconduct without which
no due process violation would exist.
The Court has treated both these justifications-preventing
prosecutorial misconduct and ensuring reliability-as touchstones of
due process. The Court has, for example, held that police misconduct
is a necessary prerequisite to finding a confession involuntary; 40 likewise, suggestive identifications violate due process only when they are
unnecessarily suggestive, 41 a qualification that is related, though not
identical, to a misconduct requirement.
37
Bowers and Steiner report results based on interviews with capital jurors from all
eleven CJP states that are consistent with our findings. According to Bowers and Steiner,
the tendency amongjurors to cast their final vote for death the shorter the period of time
they believe a defendant not sentenced to death will remain in prison does not vary with
how much or how little they believe the prosecution's evidence and arguments at the penalty phase emphasize the defendant's future dangerousness. Bowers & Steiner, supra note

24, at 665 tbl.6.

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 (1994) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., J. Mark Lane, "IsThere Life Without Parole?""A CapitalDefendants Right to a
Meaningful Alternative Sentence 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 327, 335-36 (1993) (reporting that
sentencing juries asked questions about parole eligibility in one quarter of the cases in
which a death sentence was returned).
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)
40
41
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1997).
38

39
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On the other hand, inflexible hearsay rules that preclude capital
defendants from presenting persuasive mitigating evidence violate
due process regardless of the prosecutor's conduct.4 2 Numerous
other due process rights do not depend upon prosecutorial misconduct, such as the right to voir dire on racial prejudice in a capital case
involving an interracial crime, 43 the right to a change of venue due to
widespread pretrial publicity,4 4 the right to be informed of every element of a crime before pleading guilty,45 the right to be free of apprehension of retaliatory sentencing after the exercise of the right to

appeal46 and the right to voir dire potential jurors regarding whether
they would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of
the defendant 4

7

Unfortunately, Simmons did not dearly identify one ground or the
other-preventing prosecutorial misconduct or ensuring reliabilityas the basis for its rule. Nonetheless, we think Simmons is best under8
stood as a rule of reliability. The closest analogy is Brady v. Mfaiyland.A

Brady requires the state to provide the defense with any exculpatory
evidence within its possession; moreover, Brady holds that a new trial
is required whenever such evidence is not disclosed, regardless of the
good or bad faith of the prosecutor. 49 Good faith is irrelevant because
preventing nondisclosure by a prosecutor "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused." 50 Simmons likewise contemplates a state of affairs in which
the state has in its hands information-namely, that the defendant, if
not sentenced to death, will never be eligible for parole-the effect of
which is exculpatory. If good faith will not excuse the state's failure to
provide exculpatory evidence to the defense under Brad neither
should it excuse the corresponding failure to provide exculpatory information to a capital sentencing jury under Simmons..1
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).
44 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
45
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1976).
46 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
47 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
42

43

48

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

49

Id. at 87.

5o

Id.

Our proposed approach to the "at issue" requirement also has the practical advantage of being dear and "workable." Cf. Ramndass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000)
(emphasizing that applying Simmons only to cases in which the defendant is ineligible for
parole under state law is a "workable rule"). Prosecutors would have no incentive under
our proposal to see how far they could hint at future dangerousness ithout actually crossing some invisible line. Nor would trialjudges or reviewing courts have to deal one case at
a time with the often elusive question of whether the state, either through evidence or the
argument, affirmatively "raised the specter of... future dangerousness generally." Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 (1994) (plurality opinion).
51
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CONCLUSION

Under existing doctrine, due process entitles a capital defendant
to inform the jurors who will decide his fate that, if not sentenced to
death, he will never be eligible for parole-but only if his future dangerousness is "at issue." Yet the fact of the matter is that future dangerousness is on the minds of most capital jurors and thus "at issue" in
virtually all capital trials, even if the prosecution says nothing about it.
Ironically, a capital defendant is therefore better off, all else being
equal, if the prosecutor argues that he will pose a danger to societyin which case the defendant would be entitled to a Simmons instruction-than if the prosecutor remains silent. Indeed, the prosecutor in
Shaferwas well aware of this irony; otherwise, he would not have gone
52
to such lengths to avoid a Simmons instruction.
The better approach-one not only more closely attuned to the
empirical realities of capital sentencing but also more in keeping with
the spirit of Simmons itself-would be to eliminate the "at issue" requirement altogether.

52
For example, the prosecution introduced testimony relating the fact that Shaffer
had assaulted a guard while in jail after his arrest; nonetheless, this evidence, the prosecutor claimed, was introduced "to show his character and to show his adaptability to prison,
not future dangerousness." Joint Appendix, supra note 13, at 162-63.
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